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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Despite  being  one  of  the  foundational  theories  of signed  (positive/negative)  tie formation,  the  evidence
for  balance  theory  is  far  from  conclusive.  A recent  promising  alternative  is  status  theory,  but a  theoretical
and  explanatory  gap still remains,  with  a dearth  of theories  and evidence.  We  put  forward  and  test  eight
separate  theories  of signed  tie  formation  on  two face-to-face  networks  of  friendship  and  esteem  of 282
students.  We  use  dimension  reduction  (factor  analysis)  on the  results  tables  comparing  the  predictions  of
these  eight  theories  for 50 ERGM  parameters  with  our estimated  models.  We  find  three  main  paradigms
explain  the  majority  of signed  network  formation:  balance,  status,  and  homophily.
© 2014  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
Signed ties are ubiquitous in social networks: in the playground
friendships (+) and bullying (−); in the nightclub cliques (+) and
fights (−); in the office, gossip of a friendly (+) and unfriendly (−)
nature; in a network of firms, partnerships (+) and competition (−);
in networks of states alliances (+) and disputes (−); and in social
media with chat partners (+) and blocked users (−). Despite this
ubiquity, there remains only one major theory that is regularly used
to explain signed ties – balance theory. While balance theory is neat
and simple – it states that positive and negative ties form to avoid
cognitive dissonance – the evidence for this theory is mixed, at very
best (Newcomb, 1968, 1979; Truzzi, 1973; Mower-White, 1977,
1979; Epstein, 1979; Doreian and Krackhardt, 2001; Hummon and
Doreian, 2003; van de Rijit, 2011).
There is one promising exception to the dearth of theoretical
advances in the signed tie literature, and that is the recent proposal
of status theory by Leskovec et al. (2010). Status theory conceptu-
alises of positive and negative ties as both reflecting and forming
the social hierarchy of a social network. Individuals who  receive
positive ties will be of higher status, and in turn because of this
be less likely to receive negative ties. In contrast, individuals who
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receive negative ties will be of lower status, and in turn because of
this less likely to receive positive ties.
Despite the introduction of status theory, the comprehensive
testing of a wide range of theoretical approaches to signed tie net-
works remains an outstanding task which we set out to remedy
with this paper. To do this we put forward eight separate theo-
ries that might explain signed tie formation (see Table 1). Many of
these eight theories have been applied elsewhere in social network
analyses, but only in the context of either solely positive or solely
negative tie networks. In Table 1, we  outline our interpretation
of many classical (and several original) theories of social network
analysis as applied to signed tie networks.
The rest of the paper is structured thus. First we provide a
literature review, which comprehensively overviews the eight the-
ories we have just outlined, as well as the literature on signed
ties more generally. Second, we  outline our methods and data,
explaining how we estimate a 50 parameter multiplex exponen-
tial random graph model of both our networks (the friendship
and the esteem networks) of 282 students. We also explain how
we compare the prediction tables of these eight theories for
these two networks and 50 parameters (a total of 800 predic-
tions) to the actual final estimated models for the networks,
and generate a results table of correct and incorrect predic-
tions. By conducting a factor analysis (dimension reduction) on
this results table, we are able to identify orthogonal factors that
are driving signed tie formation in our social networks. Thirdly,
our Results, Discussion, and Conclusion sections present the out-
come of this analysis, as well as our interpretation of the results
in light of previous research, and their implications for future
researchers.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2014.08.002
0378-8733/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Table  1
Definitions for the eight theories of signed tie formation.
Theory Definition
Activity theory That an individual’s likelihood of sending a new positive tie increases with (1) the number of positive ties they have already sent, or (2)
the  possession (or level) of an attribute. The same applies to negative ties
Balance theory That an individual’s likelihood of forming a new tie increases when that tie increases cognitive consistency, and decreases when that tie
creates cognitive dissonance. The major situations where dissonance occurs is where two  friends are in conflict, and the three ties in the
triad are not in ‘balance’
Homophily theory That an individual’s likelihood of forming a new positive tie increases if the person they are considering forming a tie with shares a similar
attribute, such as similar age, gender, or race. In the case of negative ties, it seems likely that the opposite would occur: the likelihood of
forming a negative tie increases with dissimilarity of individuals
Karma theory That an individual’s likelihood of sending a negative tie is proportional to the number of negative ties they receive, and their likelihood of
receiving negative ties is proportional to the number of negative ties they have sent. The same applies to positive ties
Popularity theory That an individual’s likelihood of receiving a new positive tie increases with (1) the number of positive ties they have already received, or
(2)  the possession (or level) of an attribute. The same applies to negative ties
Solidarity theory That an individual’s likelihood of receiving a positive tie will increase if both the sender and receiver are both senders or both receivers of
negative ties. This configuration involves positive ties between structurally equivalent individuals in the negative tie network
Status  theory That an individual’s likelihood of receiving positive ties increases with higher status, and likelihood of receiving negative ties increases
with  lower status. Ties themselves are indicators of status, with positive ties flowing from low status individuals to high status
individuals, and negative ties flowing in the opposite direction
Visibility theory That an individual’s likelihood of receiving positive or negative ties will be proportional to their total number of positive and negative
in-ties.  (Note that higher numbers of negative in-ties will increase the probability of receiving positive in-ties and vice versa)
2. Literature review
This literature review has three parts, first is an introduction
to balance theory, second is an introduction to status theory, and
third is a review of the last 5 years of negative tie literature, with an
organisation of this third part of the review around the remaining
six theories we are testing in this paper.
2.1. Balance theory
Balance theory is the most established and oldest theory of
signed tie formation, dating back to 1946 when Heider came
up with structural balance theory to explain sentiment relations
in dyadic and triadic relationships. A sentiment relation maybe
expressed as either positive (like) or negative (dislike). In a dyadic
relationship ‘balance’ occurs when two people reciprocally like or
dislike each other. In a triadic relationship, if the multiplication
of the signs of these relations is positive then a balanced state is
achieved. In other words, balance is achieved when all three ties
between nodes are positive or if two ties are negative and one is
positive.
Heider’s main proposition was that entities (not necessar-
ily individuals or people) tend to either form signed ties (i.e.
like/dislike ties) or change the signs of their ties so as to achieve
a ‘balanced’ state. Such a tendency is driven by a person’s desire to
avoid cognitive dissonance arising from imbalance (Hummon and
Doreian, 2003; Taylor, 1967; Zajonc, 1960). If change is not possi-
ble, then such a state of imbalance will produce tension (Cartwright
and Harary, 1956; Heider, 1946).
Much of Heider’s work on balance theory initially focused on
dyads and triads by examining undirected ties. Directed networks
were commonly dealt with thereafter by simply removing the
direction of the ties (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Cartwright and Harary (1956) were the first to formalise Hei-
der’s ideas of balance as structural balance in social networks –
i.e. the application of balance to triads of people. To them, sen-
timent relations among individuals can be thought of as a social
interpersonal network (Kadushin, 2004). Cartwright and Harary
also adapted Heider’s balance theory of micro-structures (dyads
and triads) to macro-structures (entire networks). This became the
‘structure theorem’ which broadly states that all balanced networks
can be divided into two subgroups where only positive ties exist
within each subgroup, and only negative ties exist between sub-
groups. Subsequently, this generalisation has been reformulated
to include cases where networks can be divided into two  or more
subgroups (Davis, 1967).
Support for structure theorem has been found in theoreti-
cal models and simulated networks. Wang and Thorngate (2003)
developed two Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the effect
of balancing in triads on the larger group structure and found that
groups eventually moved towards a state of balance containing no
more than two  subgroups. Similarly, Maulana (2008) in simulating
voting behaviour constrained by structure theorem found macro-
level polarisation of political preferences. However, these studies
are theoretical simulations, not based on empirical data, which calls
into question the real world applicability of structure theorem.
Meanwhile, other studies searching for balance in real world
networks find mixed evidence at best (Kalish, 2013). Epstein (1979),
in a longitudinal study of friendship choices among secondary
school students, found that friendship was not explained by “a sin-
gle theory of balance”. Mower-White (1977, 1979) experimentally
tested for balance theory in triads but found that although balance
was present, there were other biases (e.g. agreement, observer pos-
itivity, social context influence) at play. Truzzi (1973) tested for
balance theory in subgraphs of higher orders than dyads and tri-
ads through experiments. He found that when participants had a
positive orientation to others, balance theory made more success-
ful predictions. However, this result did not hold when participants
had a negative orientation to others. Newcomb (1968), Doreian and
Krackhardt (2001) found similar results where balance theory did
not appear to operate when participants have to direct a negative
tie in order to achieve balance. van de Rijit (2011) also discovered
‘jammed situations’ where changing the sign of any one tie in a net-
work will not reduce the total number of instances of imbalance
in that network. In contrast to the conflicting evidence in human
networks, some of the strongest evidence for structural balance in
the real world has been found recently in non-human mammalian
social networks of rock hyraxes (a cat-sized rodent) (Ilany et al.,
2013).
This suggests that because of the complexity of human net-
works, balance theory alone may  not be sufficient. So not only may
balance not apply consistently on the individual level (as proposed
by Heider), but it may  also not aggregate consistently into balance
at the macro-level either (as theorised by Cartwright and Harary).
2.2. Status theory
Recently a major alternative to balance theory has appeared
in the academic literature: Status theory. Status theory was first
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Table  2











1. A solid arrow represents a positive tie while a dotted arrow represents a negative
tie.
2.  ‘+’ means the theory predicts a positive parameter value (i.e. a tendency for that
subgraph) while ‘−’ means a the theory predicts a negative parameter value (i.e. a
disinclination for that subgraph).
applied to signed tie formation by Leskovec et al. (2010) as an
alternative to balance theory. The theory stems from the observa-
tion that positive/negative ties may  have multiple interpretations
depending on the intention of the sender (Guha et al., 2004). This
suggests that signed tie formation may  be driven by other mecha-
nisms than a desire for cognitive consistency.
Leskovec et al. (2010) only provides a cursory description of
the mechanism behind Status theory: deference – where positive
ties are directed to those of higher status while negative ties are
directed to those of lower status (see also Lim and Rubineau, 2013).
The best way to get a clear understanding of status theory is
to compare its predictions for dyadic and triadic tie formation on a
signed tie network with those of balance theory. Table 2 shows four
common subgraphs that might be found in a signed tie network.
Looking at the bottom tie in each network (the lowest tie in the
dyad/triad), we ask, is this tie more (+) or less (−) likely to form
under status theory (or balance theory), given the presence of the
other ties in that subgraph (relatively to an empty graph).
So taking the first subgraph, reciprocity AB, the pre-existing tie
is a positive tie from i to j. This makes the likelihood of a negative
tie from j to i less likely (−) because balance theory says that people
favour cognitive consistency. However, in the case of status theory,
the pre-existing tie acts as a social cue that j is of higher status than
i. Because j is of higher status, j’s likelihood of sending a negative
tie to i is actually higher (+), since status theory says that negative
ties flow from those of high status to those of low status.
In the second subgraph, Transitive Triad (T9), all the ties are
positive. Balance theory predicts that the tie from i to j will be more
likely to form than chance because j is a friend of a friend. Also
note that the other method of calculating a balanced triad works:
the multiplication of the signs of the ties of the triad is positive,
indicating balance. Status theory also predicts that the tie from i
to j will be more likely to form than chance because j is of higher
status than i. This is in turn because i directs a tie to k (making k
of higher status), and k directs a tie to j (making j of even higher
status).
In the third subgraph, Cyclical Triad (T10), all the ties are positive
again. Balance theory, again, predicts that the tie from i to j will be
more likely to form than chance because j is a friend of a friend.
Note the positive multiplication of signs of sides also works. Status
theory, however, makes very different predictions. Status theory
predicts that the tie from i to j is less likely to form than chance
because i is of higher status than j. This is in turn because j directs
a tie to k (making k of higher status), and k directs a tie to i (making
i of even higher status).
In the fourth subgraph, a mixed cyclical triad (CAAB), balance
and status theories again make opposite predictions. Balance the-
ory predicts that the negative tie from i to j will be less likely (−)
to form because j is a friend of a friend. Note also, how the mul-
tiplication of the signs of the three ties is negative. Status theory,
however, predicts that the negative tie from i to j will be more likely
(+) to form because i is of higher status than j. i is of higher status
because j directs a positive tie to k, and k directs a positive tie to i,
thus making i the highest status person in the triad.
As can be seen from the above examples, Status theory makes an
interesting and useful addition to the theoretical tools available for
those wanting to analyse signed tie networks. It provides a large
number of predictions which contradict those of balance theory,
yet at the same time have a coherent and sound logic of their own.
As we will show in our analysis later in this paper, Status theory
does seem to have a sound place in the long term cannon of signed
tie literature.
2.3. Other recent negative tie literature
In this section we  review other articles published in the last five
years on negative ties, and also the papers presented at the special
sessions on negative ties at the Sunbelt Conference in Hamburg
Germany in 2013. We  organise this section around the theories
that are the basis of our later analysis.
2.3.1. Visibility
According to our formulation, visibility theory states that an
individual will be more likely to receive inties if they are already the
recipient of inties, either positive or negative. The existing literature
already has at least one example of evidence of this: Carboni (2013)
finds that centrality in the positive tie network leads to receiving
negative inties.
2.3.2. Popularity
Popularity is distinct from visibility in one important way: ties
are partitioned from one another in popularity. Positive inties only
increase the chance of other positive inties. Negative inties only
increase the chance of other negative inties. Much of the existing
literature focuses on developing new centrality measures with the
aim of better measuring popularity effects (Everett and Borgatti,
2014; Smith et al., 2014). A number of other studies use existing
measures of centrality to study the effect of popularity in novel sit-
uations (Szell et al., 2010; Ellwardt et al., 2012; Daly and Moolenaar,
2013; Carboni and Casciaro, 2013)
2.3.3. Activity
Interestingly, within the existing literature, popularity (inde-
gree) and activity (outdegree) are often addressed within the same
papers, and activity receives relatively little distinct attention. As
will be shown in our later analysis (see Sections 4 and 5), activity is
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entirely theoretically distinct from popularity, appearing to load on
an entirely different component to popularity. This said, the exist-
ing literature which makes reference to signed ties and activity is
largely the literature listed under the heading ‘Popularity’.
2.3.4. Karma
Our theory of Karma states that an individual’s extent of positive
indegree will be proportionate to their positive outdegree, their
negative indegree will be proportionate to their negative outde-
gree, and so forth. We  were able to find nothing in the existing
literature which made reference to any theory or mechanism that
approximated this.
2.3.5. Solidarity
This is the theory of the unity of the bullied and the bullies. We
were able to find one paper that has found evidence of this: Huitsing
et al. (2012) ran an ERG model of networks of like, dislike and bul-
lying and found positive ties between those structurally equivalent
in either the dislike and the bullying networks.
2.3.6. Homophily
Homophily is that attraction of like for like. The literature dis-
tinguishes between two main types of homophily: inbreeding and
baseline homophily. Baseline homophily is the tendency for similar
individuals to be attracted to each other, simply because of the pop-
ulation proportions. For example, if 75% of a population is Chinese,
then, at random, we would expect 75% of the friends of Chinese peo-
ple to share their race. Inbreeding homophily is attraction over and
above that which would occur at random, and is generally thought
to be the product of preference of individuals for people of the same
type. For example, if in the case just discussed, 85% of the friends of
Chinese people are Chinese, then 10% of these friends are a result
of inbreeding homophily (McPherson et al., 2001).
In single time point datasets – such as ours – it is almost impossi-
ble to distinguish homophily (a preference for similar others) from
either social influence (a tendency to make others like ourselves)
and other forms of segregation (such as the tendency to be tied to
similar others because of third factors).
We were able to find at least three studies in the last three years
that suggested the operation of homophily in signed tie networks.
Lusher et al. (2013) found that node attributes (such as racism) help
explain negative tie networks (“Do you have a difference of opin-
ion?”). Nieuwenhuis et al. (2013) found that religious diversity,
amongst other things, drove conflict between neighbours. Young
and Weerman (2013) found that school children tended to adopt
the deviant behaviour and beliefs of their friends, and also to select
their friends who shared the same deviant behaviour. However, not
all studies were as conclusive. Jaspers et al. (2013) found ethnicity
and immigrant origin had mixed results on likelihood of school chil-
dren receiving/sending negative ties across Germany, Netherlands,
Sweden, and England.
3. Methods and data
3.1. Dataset
The dataset was collected primarily for use in this paper. This is
the first time that this dataset has been published from. The data
was collected in January 2013. Our dataset was drawn from the
final two years of a medium sized Singaporean business university.
The students represented two cohorts of students from a bachelor
of social science. All 298 students in the selected cohorts were sent
the survey and 282 (94.5%) completed the survey. This is a very high
response rate, even for a social network survey.
The final dataset included only the 282 respondents. The 16 non-
respondents and any ties to them were removed.
Students were recruited using multiple methods: they were sent
emails, and then multiple reminder emails. They were also encour-
aged to do the survey during class time, and given a $5 incentive to
do the survey. The survey was done online to make the survey both
easier for respondents to complete, and easier for us as surveyors
to enter and clean the data.
The mean age of respondents was  22.7 years. Respondents were
approximately evenly split between 3rd and 4th year students. We
chose the 3rd and 4th year cohorts because they had had the longest
period of continuous contact with one another: The 3rd years had
known each other for approximately two  and a half years, and the
4th years had known each other for approximately three and half
years. The bachelor of social science itself, is very much like a small
liberal arts college in Singapore, with small, seminar-style classes,
and close student–student, and student–teacher interactions. We
felt that this would mean that social network effects would be
particularly strong after 2–3 years of their development. From a
balance perspective, one would expect that 2–3 years should give
time for the effects of balance to be able to ‘sort themselves’ and
become apparent.
Alongside a range of demographic questions (gender (Binary),
age (Continuous), race (Categorical), first major (Categorical),
membership of executive committee of student society (Binary),
family income (Continuous)), students were asked four social net-
work questions. It should be noted, that we originally asked much
more abstract questions about friendship and esteem. However,
when we did ethnographic pretesting of our surveys, we found
that these questions produced very poor responses from intervie-
wees. The problem was that interviewees had trouble knowing
exactly what we meant by these abstract terms like ‘friendship’
or ‘esteem’. We  workshopped the questions with multiple focus
groups, and found that ‘proxies’ – concrete hypothetical situations
– were felt by the majority of participants to be much easier to
understand, and also best captured the dimensions of friendship
and esteem we were targeting. We  also found that students were
both more likely to answer, and answered the questionnaire more
quickly (response time was reduced threefold), when they were
given concrete hypothetical situations. Our final questions were1:
1. Who  would you invite for lunch?
2. Who  would you avoid having lunch with?
3. Who  would you nominate to lead the students’ council?
4. Who  would you avoid nominating to lead the students’ council?
These four questions are asked as proxies for (1) like/positive
affect, (2) dislike/negative affect, (3) esteem/admiration, and (4)
disesteem/disdain.
For each question, the students were asked to nominate
between one and five other students in their year/cohort (i.e. 3rd
years could only nominate 3rd years, and 4th years only other 4th
years). A minimum of one nomination was  included to try to over-
come the negative and potentially costly action of nominating other
2 The exact questions for 4th years were: (1) You are going for lunch after class,
please list at least one [social science] student admitted in 2009 you would invite for
lunch. (2) You are going for lunch after class, please list at least one [social science]
student admitted in 2009 you would avoid having lunch with. (You may repeat nom-
inations from previous questions.) (3) There is a new student council at [university]
that can potentially change your life in [university] and your prospects after grad-
uation significantly. Please list at least 1 [social science] student admitted in 2009
you would nominate to lead this new student council. (You may repeat nominations
from previous questions.) (4) There is a new student council at [university] that can
potentially change your life in [university] and your prospects after graduation sig-
nificantly. Please list at least 1 [social science] student admitted in 2009 you would
avoid nominating to lead this new student council. (You may  repeat nominations
from previous questions.) 3rd year were asked the same questions except they were
requested to nominate students admitted in 2010.
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students for the negative ties (questions two and four). The lit-
erature on force response questions (Russell, 1993; Stieger et al.,
2007) says that there are two main potential problems with forced
responses: (1) it decreases response rate, and (2) if respondents are
expressing an opinion about something they have no knowledge
of their answers would reduce the accuracy of the survey. In our
case, the first problem did not occur: we had a 94.5% response rate.
The second problem, we felt, was not an issue as the students had
known each other, and had taken numerous classes together, for
at least two and a half years. Informal post-survey interviews with
students suggested that the vast majority had no problem with the
forced response, with a small minority (15 people) making either
one self-nomination or nominating the first person (like a donkey
vote) on the survey. This amounted to 19 ties (nominations), and
we removed these ties (not the individuals, just the ties) from the
dataset and coded them as empty ties.
What makes lunch an operationalisation of friendship and dis-
like? Through our qualitative interviews, we found that lunch was
seen as a good proxy for friendship simply because eat a meal is a
necessity, and it is a social situation that can be shared with people
whose company you like. What makes nomination to lead/not lead
students’ council a measure for esteem/disesteem? Through our
qualitative interviews we found that nomination to lead students’
council was a good proxy for esteem because nominating someone
for student council is an act of indicating that you hold them in high
respect, for a public office with limited number of positions.
We  further tested our operationalisation of friendship and
esteem by undertaking a short survey of 448 students from the
same university.2 We  asked four questions:
1. List 4 adjectives that describe your feelings towards someone
you would go to lunch with. (open-ended)
2. List 4 adjectives that describe your feelings towards someone
you would nominate for students’ council. (open-ended)
3. Thinking about the people you would go to lunch with, would
you best describe them as:
a. People you have friendship with
b. People you hold in esteem, respect, or feel have high status
4. Thinking about the people you would nominate for students’
council, would you best describe them as:
c. People you have friendship with
d. People you hold in esteem, respect, or feel have high status
The results of this survey are collated in Fig. 1a–c. Notice that
the most common adjective used to describe a person you would
go to lunch with is ‘Friendly’, while the most common adjective
used to describe a person you would nominate for student election
is ‘Respect’. Note also that when students were presented with a
forced choice question as to how to categorise people they would
go to lunch with, or nominate for elections, 90%+ chose to associate
lunch with friendship, and elections with esteem.
3.2. Exponential random graph modelling
We  compare the dynamics of positive and negative tie formation
in two different types of networks: an affect (going to lunch) net-
work, and an esteem (nominating for students’ council) network.
We are interested in both what are known as endogenous network
effects – those produced purely by the structural effects of ties on
3 This survey was done 18 months after the original survey. We  believe that the
fact that these 770 students are of the same age and drawn from the same cul-
tural context as our first dataset, means that their understanding of the concepts









































Forced Choice: Descripon of nominees for
lunch and elecon
Friendsh ip Es teem
Fig. 1. (a) Four most common adjectives used to describe someone you would go to
lunch with. (b) Four most common adjectives used to describe someone you would
nominate for students’ council. (c) Forced choice description of nominees for lunch
and  elections: Are they ‘friends’ or people held in ‘esteem’?.
each other – and exogenous network effects – those produced by
the effects of attributes of actors on tie formation.
Most prior studies of balance theory have tended to look for
over or under representation of triadic configurations associated
with balance. They have done this by comparing the prevalence of
triads in observed graphs with their prevalence in random graphs
(controlling for density, or perhaps degree distribution). However,
there is the danger that the prevalence of various balanced triads
found in these studies are actually epiphenomena driven by lower
order subgraphs, such as stars or paths.
We control for lower order subgraphs using exponential random
graph models. In these models, the dependent (outcome) variable is
the formation of a new network tie. The independent variables – for
structural effects in the model – are various subgraphs that repre-
sent network dependencies. These subgraphs include: reciprocity,
in- and out-stars, triads, and two-paths (Wasserman and Pattison,
1996; Snijders, 2002; Snijders et al., 2006; Robins et al., 2009).
To model the interplay between positive and negative ties we
use a special multiplex version (called XPNet) of the exponential
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Table  3
Key parameters in XPNet.
Notes:
1. A solid arrow represents a positive tie while a dotted arrow represents a negative tie.
2.  Two  strokes on a tie represents the absence of that tie.
3. For a complete list of parameters and more detailed explanations on each parameter refer to the “PNet User Manual” available here: http://sna.unimelb.edu.au/ data/assets/
pdf file/0006/662865/PNetManual.pdf (Wang et al., 2006a,b).
*  This parameter was  not included in the model because graph density as fixed.
# This parameter was not included in the model because it was prohibited by the nature of the data.
random graph modelling software PNet (Wang et al., 2006a,b;
Wang, 2013; see also its use in Robins et al., 2011). PNet estimates
ERG models using a MCMCMLE3 (Snijders, 2002). XPNet allows
the modelling of two networks, in our case a positive and a neg-
ative network. Because two networks are present, a vast array of
4 Monte Carlo Markov Chain Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
new network subgraphs (independent variables) are introduced to
the model. In Table 3 we present diagrams and labels for the key
parameters used in our models.
Note that in the parameter list in Table 3 the parameter Arc-AB –
which is entrainment of the A and B tie – is both excluded from the
model, and prohibited (meaning that it cannot form). This prohibi-
tion of Arc-AB ties comes from the fact that it is impossible and/or
meaningless to both want to and not want to go to lunch with
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someone (and similarly to nominate and avoid nominating for stu-
dents’ council). In the cases (48 ties in total: ∼3% of all ties) where
our survey participants did nominate people for both positive and
negative ties of the same type (affect/esteem), then we assumed
that their negative tie nominations was a mistake and removed
it, since this question was asked after the positive tie question,
suggesting that the individual misunderstood the question or was
avoiding answering the negative tie question.
The esteem (elections) and the affect (lunch) networks were
modelled separately as XPNet only allows for the modelling of the
interaction of two networks at one time.
XPNet (and ERGMs more generally) estimate a model of the form
(Koskinen and Daraganova, 2013):
P(xi = 1|A, B) =
1
1 + e−1(ˇ1s1 + ˇ2s2 + · · · + c)
(1)
Our XPNet/ERG models were estimated on a dataset which com-
bined both the 3rd and 4th year networks. Because actors in these
two networks were unable to nominate each other as tie part-
ners, it was necessary to account for this in our model. We did so
using structural zeros – basically we fed the computer programme
a matrix which specified which ties could form and not – forcing
ties to only be formed within each cohort.
To facilitate fitting of the model, graph density was  fixed, and
hence Arc A and Arc B parameters were not included in the model.
3.3. Factor analysis
Factor analysis is a technique for helping to explain the struc-
ture of a set of variables in terms of higher or simpler ‘explanatory
constructs’ knows as factors (or latent variables). These are, gener-
ally, a smaller number of variables than the initial set of variables,
thus giving name to the concept of ‘dimension reduction’.
In our analysis we use SPSS to run a Factor Analysis with a Vari-
max  Rotation on two valued matrices (one for affect, one for status).
The columns were the eight theories of signed tie formation, and
the rows were the approximately 50 parameters in our converged
model. We  assigned each cell a score from −2 (if the ERGM results
were directly contradicting the theories predictions) to 2 (if the
ERGM results were directly in support of the theories predictions).
The predictions table is laid out in Table 4, and the detailed scoring
system is laid out in Table 5.
4. Results
We  present the results in four sections: (1) first, descriptive
statistics, where we compare our observed networks (of affect and
esteem) to a sample of random graphs; (2) second, ERG models,
where we model the effects of various subgraphs on the formation
of network ties; (3) third, goodness of fit (GOF) statistics, where we
present assessments of the fit of our ERG models; and (4) fourth,
factor analysis, where we apply dimension reduction to the range
of subgraphs in the ERG models, and attempt to identify the major
latent factors driving signed tie formation in our networks.
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 6 shows various descriptive statistics for our dataset. Over-
all there were 298 students who could have potentially participated
in our study, of whom 282 did. These 282 students sent 987 like
ties to each other, 499 dislike ties to each other, 540 esteem ties
to each other, and 394 disesteem ties to each other. Our sample
was divided into 181 females and 101 males (reflecting the demo-
graphics of the school), with 225 Chinese, and small percentages
of Indians, Malays, and other races. Eighteen of the students had
served on the executive of the Social Science Society: the repre-
sentative body of social science students at the university, which is
responsible for organising both student social and welfare events.
Tables 7 and 8 show extracts of comparisons of the graph statis-
tics (such as counts of key parameters) for the observed affect
(Table 7) and esteem (Table 8) networks, with the graphs statis-
tics of 1000 sample graphs drawn from a distribution of (unbiased)
random graphs, with the same density. If the observed count is
higher than the sample mean, then this is evidence that there is
a statistical tendency towards forming that particular subgraph in
the observed network. If, on the other hand, the observed count is
lower than the sample mean, then this is evidence that there is a sta-
tistical tendency against the formation of that particular subgraph
in the observed network.
In these models, A ties are positive ties (i.e. Affect/would like
to go to lunch with) and B ties are negative ties (i.e. Dislike/would
avoid going to lunch with).
The most important thing to look for when reading these tables
is the t-statistics (or ‘t-stat’), and in particular, if the absolute value
of this is larger than 2. The t-statistic is the difference between the
observed count and the sample mean count for a statistic, divided
by the standard deviation of the sample mean for that statistic. A t-
stat of larger than 2 signifies that the chance of the observed graph’s
count on this statistic happened at random is quite small. While we
can not necessarily assume a normal probability distribution of the
graph, we can use the t-stat of 2 (which equates to the p-value
of 0.05 for a normal distribution) as a rule of thumb for assessing
statistical significance.
A brief review of the affect model reveals that the most promi-
nent outlying parameters are: reciprocity A; transitive triad A,
cyclical triad A, AKT-TA, AKT-DA, AKT-UA, same category A reci-
procity race, same category A first SOSS major, different category A
reciprocity race, different category A first SOSS major, 2-In-Star B,
3-In-Star B, K-In-Star B, TABB, and UKT-BAB
A brief review of the status model reveals that the most promi-
nent outlying parameters are: 2-In-Star A, 3-In-Star A, K-In-Star A,
A2P-UA, 2-In-Star B, 3-In-Star B, and A2P-UB.
4.2. ERG models
Tables 9 and 10 show the final converged (and fitted) multiplex
exponential random graph models for both our affect and esteem
networks.
The parameters and standard error can be read as per a standard
logistic regression. The star in the last column of our table indicates
that the (parameter)/std. err. ≥ 2, using the convention of a z-score
of 2, and p-value (assuming a normal distribution) of 0.05.
Note that it is the values in the second column (under ‘parame-
ter’) that are used for comparing to our predictions table (Table 4)
in our factor analysis.
The third column is the ‘convergence statistic’. This is a statis-
tic which is used to check whether the model itself is a good fit
for the observed dataset. 1000 sample graphs are generated using
the estimated parameters, and the mean graph statistics of these
sample graphs are compared to the observed graph statistics of the
collected networks. This difference is then divided by the standard
deviation of the mean of the sample graphs. The number which
results is our convergence statistic. It is very similar to the t-stat
in the baseline random graph models discussed in the previous
section. For parameters in the model, we want this convergence
statistic to be ideally below 0.1, and definitely below 0.2 (by con-
vention).
The substance of these tables will be interpreted in the next
section, but note that we  find homophily (1) in the positive affect
network along the dimensions of gender, executive membership,
income, and first major; (2) in the negative affect network along
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Table  4
Summary of key predictions made by the eight theories of signed tie formation.
Activity Th. Balance Th. Homophily Th. Karma Th. Popularity Th. Solidarity Th. Status Th. Visibility Th.
ReciprocityA 0 + 0 + 0 0 − 0
SinkA  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SourceA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IsolatesA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In-K-StarA(2.00) 0 0 0 0 + 0 + +
Out-K-StarA(2.00) + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AKT-TA(2.00) + + 0 0 + 0 + +
AKT-CA(2.00) 0 + 0 + 0 0 − 0
AKT-DA(2.00) 0 + 0 + + 0 0 +
AKT-UA(2.00) + + 0 0 0 0 0 0
A2P-TA(2.00) 0 + 0 + + 0 + +
rbA  for Attribute Gender 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0
rbA  for Attribute Exec 0 0 + 0 0 0 − 0
rsA  for Attribute Gender 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
rsA  for Attribute Exec 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 0
rrA  for Attribute Gender 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
rrA  for Attribute Exec 0 0 0 0 0 0 + 0
receiverA of Continuous Attribute Age 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
rbDiffA of Continuous Attribute Income 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0
Same  Category ArcA for Attribute Race 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0
Same  Category ArcA for
Attribute First SOSS Major
0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0
ReciprocityB 0 + 0 + 0 0 − 0
SinkB  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SourceB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IsolatesB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In-K-StarB(2.00) 0 0 0 0 + 0 + +
Out-K-StarB(2.00) + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AKT-TB(2.00) + − 0 0 + − + +
AKT-CB(2.00) 0 − 0 + 0 − − 0
AKT-DB(2.00) 0 − 0 + + − 0 +
AKT-UB(2.00) + − 0 0 0 − 0 0
A2P-TB(2.00) 0 + 0 + + 0 + +
rbB  for Attribute Gender 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0
rbB  for Attribute Exec 0 0 − 0 0 0 − 0
rsB  for Attribute Gender 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
rsB  for Attribute Exec 0 0 0 0 0 0 + 0
rrB  for Attribute Gender 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
rrB  for Attribute Exec 0 0 0 0 0 0 − +
rbDiffB of Continuous Attribute Age 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0
ReciprocityAB 0 − 0 − 0 0 + 0
In2StarAB 0 0 0 0 0 0 − +
TKT-ABA(2.00) 0 − 0 0 0 0 − +
CKT-ABA(2.00) 0 − 0 − 0 0 + 0
DKT-ABA(2.00) 0 − 0 − 0 0 0 +
UKT-ABA(2.00) 0 − 0 0 0 0 0 0
TKT-BAB(2.00) 0 + 0 0 0 + − +
CKT-BAB(2.00) 0 + 0 − 0 + + 0
DKT-BAB(2.00) 0 + 0 − 0 + 0 +
M-rbm for Attribute Gender 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0
M-diffm for Attribute Age 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0
Notes:
1. ‘+’ means the theory predicts a positive parameter value (i.e. a tendency for that subgraph) while ‘−’ means a the theory predicts a negative parameter value (i.e. a
disinclination for that subgraph).
2.  ‘0′ means no prediction is made by that theory.
Table 5





+ 2 −2 −1
−  −2 2 −1
0  −1 −1 1
Notes:
1. ‘+’ means the theory predicts a positive parameter value (i.e. a tendency for that
subgraph) while ‘−’ means a the theory predicts a negative parameter value (i.e. a
disinclination for that subgraph).
2.  ‘0’ means no prediction is made by that theory.
the dimensions of gender (similar genders dislike each other) and
age (different ages dislike each other); (3) in the positive esteem
network along the dimensions of executive membership, income,
first major, and race (negative homophily–heterophily); and (4) in
the negative esteem network along zero dimensions.
4.3. GOF statistics
A standard test of the adequacy of an ERG model is a goodness
of fit test. This involves running simulations of the model using the
estimated parameters, and not only comparing the fit of the model
for the estimated parameters, but also for subgraphs which are not
in the model.
The rule of thumb which is used in these goodness of fit (GOF)
tests is this: parameters that are in the model should have a
‘convergence statistic’ of below 0.1 ideally, and definitely below
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Table  6
Descriptive statistics for the observed networks.
Year 4 Year 3 Total
No. of students 159 139 298
No.  of participants 150 132 282
No.  of positive affect ties 501 486 987
No.  of negative affect ties 262 237 499
No.  of positive esteem ties 270 270 540
No.  of negative esteem ties 210 184 394
Female 110 71 181
Males 40 61 101
Chinese 126 99 225
Indian 11 14 25
Malay 5 8 13
Eurasian 3 1 4
Others 5 10 15
Held positions in Student
Welfare Exco Committee
8 10 18
0.2; and parameters that are not in the model should ideally have
a ‘convergence statistic’ of below 2.
The GOF statistics for our two models are presented in
Tables 11 and 12.
You can see in the affect network (Table 11) that all of the
parameters in the model are fitted. All but five of the parameters
not in the model are fitted. Of the 5 parameter that do not fit, two
(Out2StarAB and UKT-BAB) have t-statistics (convergence statis-
tics) that are greater than three, but both are below four. Given the
large number of fitted statistics both in the model (43) and not in
the model (131, not including the 43 in the model), we think that
having 5 parameters is within an adequate margin of error.
You can see in the esteem network (Table 12) that all of the
parameters in the model are fitted. All but seven of the parame-
ters not in the model are fitted. Of the remaining parameters two
(Out2StarAB and Skew Indegree Distribution B) have t-statistics
(convergence statistics) greater than three, but below five. Given
the large number of statistics fitted in the model (47) and not in
the model (124) we  think that seven parameters slightly outside
the margins of good fit is acceptable.
Another thing to note is that much of our problems with fit are
related to our original study design, with our initial decision to force
both a minimum and maximum outdegree of participants. This
subsequently has made modelling outdegree with ERGMs quite dif-
ficult, and hence convergence of outdegree parameters in the these
models quite fraught.
4.4. Factor analysis
Tables 13 and 14 show the results of the factor analysis of
the parameters of the affect and esteem models. The models are
Table 7
Comparison of key parameters in the affect network to a baseline random graph model.
Parameters Observation Sample mean Std. Dev. t-Statistica
ReciprocityA 232 12.518 3.385 64.843
2-In-StarA 2255 1723.231 40.158 13.242
2-Out-StarA 1567 1723.877 42.085 −3.728
3-In-StarA 4309 1999.369 146.09 15.81
3-Out-StarA 1369 2003.431 152.704 −4.155
030TA  743 85.82 9.409 69.844
030CA  173 28.526 5.45 26.509
K-In-StarA(2.00) 1112.375 1041.584 8.407 8.42
AKT-TA(2.00) 601.125 83.961 9.017 57.354
AKT-CA(2.00) 424.125 83.726 15.703 21.677
AKT-DA(2.00) 556.023 84.028 9.041 52.205
AKT-UA(2.00) 610 84.02 9.056 58.081
RbA  Exec 29 3.696 1.885 13.424
Same  Category A Reciprocity Race 134 7.124 2.611 48.592
Same  Category A Reciprocity First SOSS Major 94 4.297 2.109 42.527
Different Category A Reciprocity Race 98 5.394 2.206 41.983
Different Category A Reciprocity First SOSS Major 138 8.221 2.705 47.969
ReciprocityB 7 2.655 1.584 2.743
2-In-StarB 1208 383.526 19.969 41.288
2-Out-StarB 437 381.328 19.133 2.91
3-In-StarB 3574 210.535 35.713 94.18
3-Out-StarB 350 207.92 33.915 4.189
030TB 49 8.954 3.105 12.898
030CB  3 3.034 1.712 −0.02
K-In-StarB(2.00) 485.769 296.781 9.284 20.357
K-Out-StarB(2.00) 296.375 295.523 9.149 0.093
AKT-TB(2.00) 47.5 8.913 3.079 12.532
AKT-CB(2.00) 8.5 9.057 5.089 −0.11
AKT-DB(2.00) 42 8.914 3.082 10.734
AKT-UB(2.00) 47.5 8.908 3.08 12.528
RbB  Exec 4 1.651 1.284 1.829
TABA  40 40.224 6.438 −0.035
TABB  135 18.94 4.515 25.707
TBBA  66 19.302 4.453 10.486
TBAB  39 19.375 4.411 4.449
TAAB  47 40.624 6.355 1.003
TBAA  52 40.511 6.341 1.812
CAAB  55 40.242 6.161 2.395
CBBA  35 18.738 4.384 3.709
Note:
1. This table only shows the key parameters with a high t-statistic.
2. For a full comparison, please contact the authors of this paper.
a t-Statistics = observation−sample meanstandard deviation .
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Table  8
Comparison of key parameters in the esteem network to a baseline random graph model.
Parameters Observation Sample mean Std. Dev. t-Statistica
ReciprocityA 14 3.708 1.952 5.274
2-In-StarA 1559 512.95 22.942 45.596
2-Out-StarA 495 513.174 21.94 −0.828
3-In-StarA 4665 322.159 47.333 91.752
3-Out-StarA 348 322.695 45.085 0.561
030TA 81 13.864 3.961 16.948
030CA 4 4.638 2.228 −0.286
K-In-StarA(2.00) 604.235 383.463 9.581 23.042
AKT-TA(2.00) 74.75 13.78 3.911 15.59
AKT-CA(2.00) 11.5 13.828 6.611 −0.352
AKT-DA(2.00) 74.75 13.789 3.931 15.51
AKT-UA(2.00) 79 13.775 3.919 16.643
RbA  Exec 21 2.02 1.367 13.889
Same  Category A Reciprocity Race 6 2.1 1.446 2.696
Same  Category A Reciprocity First SOSS Major 6 1.343 1.192 3.907
Different Category A Reciprocity Race 8 1.608 1.246 5.131
Different Category A Reciprocity First SOSS Major 8 2.365 1.56 3.612
ReciprocityB 7 1.847 1.329 3.876
2-In-StarB 776 254.046 16.28 32.06
2-Out-StarB 244 253.555 15.822 −0.604
3-In-StarB 1880 112.788 24.063 73.44
3-Out-StarB 165 111.821 23.262 2.286
030TB 17 4.754 2.153 5.687
030CB  1 1.652 1.323 −0.493
K-In-StarB(2.00) 351.848 205.942 8.84 16.504
K-Out-StarB(2.00) 176 205.687 8.659 −3.428
AKT-TB(2.00) 16.5 4.744 2.147 5.476
AKT-CB(2.00) 3 4.94 3.944 −0.492
AKT-DB(2.00) 16.5 4.738 2.139 5.498
AKT-UB(2.00) 17 4.736 2.142 5.726
RbB  Exec 5 1.384 1.191 3.037
TABA  24 9.893 2.998 4.706
TABB  43 6.999 2.654 13.566
TBBA  21 7.013 2.678 5.223
TBAB  14 6.871 2.659 2.681
TAAB  20 9.848 3.277 3.098
TBAA  43 10.023 3.136 10.515
CAAB  9 9.761 3.226 −0.236
CBBA  12 6.954 2.655 1.9
Note:
1. This table only shows the key parameters with a high t-statistic.
2. For a full comparison, please contact the authors of this paper.
a t-Statistics = observation−sample meanstandard deviation .
relatively parsimonious – eight theories have relatively neatly
loaded across three main components in both models. The mod-
els also have strong explanatory value – these three components
explaining between 69 and 73% of variance in the observed data.
In both the affect and the esteem network, the same three latent
dimensions (or ‘components’) were identified and extracted by the
factor analysis. We  considered a theory to be loaded in a component
if its contribution to that theory is greater than 0.6/−0.6.
To further test this, we constructed indexes based on this rule,
where for each component, all theories that made a contribution
to a component greater than 0.6/less than −0.6 were combined
into an index, and the Cronbach Alpha calculated. The results of
these Cronbach Alpha calculations are presented in the final row of
Tables 13 and 14. As can be seen, in all cases but one (the last), where
a Cronbach Alpha can be calculated, it is greater than 0.69, suggest-
ing these theories are measuring a common underlying construct.
Another way to conceptualise the factor analysis contained in
Tables 13 and 14 is contained in Fig. 2. This is a Venn diagram of the
results of Tables 13 and 14. Theories which are significant in any
component for either model (have a loading greater than 0.6/less
than −0.6) are grouped together, and this group is named after its
most prominent member. We  can see that there are three main
groupings: Status, Balance, and Homophily. We can see that each
dimension (except Homophily) comprises of one or more other the-
ories. We  can also seen that, the theories of Solidarity and Activity
do not neatly fit into this classification, but seem to lie between
the dimensions of Balance and Homophily, or possibly incorporate
elements of both into their mechanisms of action.
5. Discussion
The kingdom of signed ties has been ruled by a single theory
for many decades: balance. Very recently, a new, and compelling
challenge has been posed by status theory. What our study shows,
is that in fact, signed ties are ruled by a triumvirate of sociological
forces – balance, status, and homophily – which in almost equal
measure play their part in contributing to signed tie formation.
In this discussion section we will review our research question
and how we  came to answer it, including reviewing our evidence.
We will then review the implications of our findings for the deeper
sociological mechanisms that may  be driving signed tie formation.
Finally, we will assess the contribution of this study vis-à-vis the
existing literature.
Our research question was  “What are the fundamental forces
driving signed tie formation?” We began by collecting signed tie
data on almost 300 university students, and then estimated and
fitted two  50 parameter ERGM models for the affect and esteem
networks of these students. We  then ran a factor analysis (dimen-
sion reduction) on the results to see how the eight major theories
contributed to explaining the observed models. Factor analysis
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Table  9
ERG model of affect network.
Parameter Std. Err. Convergence statistic
ReciprocityA 3.672441 −0.15223 0.018a
SourceA −0.70641 −0.4426 0.033
In-K-StarA (2.00) 0.469839 −0.16993 0.019a
Out-K-StarA (2.00) −0.80121 −0.16287 0.018a
AKT-TA (2.00) 0.588566 −0.23725 0.033a
AKT-CA (2.00) −0.4194 −0.06701 0.046a
AKT-DA (2.00) 0.07447 −0.13263 0.037
AKT-UA (2.00) 0.688826 −0.19299 0.036a
A2P-TA (2.00) −0.14822 −0.01881 0.032a
rbA for Attribute Gender 0.590079 −0.09428 −0.059a
rbA for Attribute Exec 0.735038 −0.07647 −0.057a
rsA for Attribute Gender −0.46361 −0.09567 −0.134
rrA  for Attribute Gender −0.28244 −0.07371 −0.104
rbDiffA of Continuous Attribute Income −0.09212 −0.02214 −0.015a
Same Category ArcA for Attribute First SOSS Major 0.174457 −0.0505 0.032a
ReciprocityB 0.782198 −0.43505 0.033
SinkB −4.62128 −0.46284 −0.023a
SourceB −1.81699 −0.42099 0.054a
IsolatesB −6.312 −0.6268 −0.041a
In-K-StarB (2.00) 2.023473 −0.19827 0.025a
Out-K-StarB (2.00) 2.037358 −0.20363 −0.019a
AKT-TB (2.00) 0.564812 −0.57167 0.025
AKT-CB (2.00) −0.22132 −0.20553 0.034
AKT-DB (2.00) −0.62907 −0.30301 0.018a
AKT-UB (2.00) 0.372433 −0.53653 0.026
A2P-TB (2.00) −0.02818 −0.02071 0.029
rbB  for Attribute Gender 0.647457 −0.198 −0.086a
rbB for Attribute Exec −0.19711 −0.52576 −0.035
rsB  for Attribute Gender −0.41067 −0.12444 −0.093a
rsB for Attribute Exec 0.125038 −0.17588 0.001
rrB for Attribute Gender −0.46279 −0.12749 −0.091a
rrB for Attribute Exec 0.332742 −0.08359 −0.012a
rbDiffB of Continuous Attribute Age 0.064604 −0.02977 −0.001
ReciprocityAB −0.44969 −0.59946 −0.015
In2StarAB 0.018953 −0.01038 0.036
TKT-ABA (2.00) −0.08111 −0.21726 0.039
CKT-ABA (2.00) 0.369151 −0.19485 0.044
DKT-ABA (2.00) 0.026459 −0.19203 0.021
UKT-ABA (2.00) −0.10392 −0.19087 0.064
TKT-BAB (2.00) 0.359217 −0.20565 0.066
CKT-BAB (2.00) 0.127491 −0.20662 0.076
M-rbm for Attribute Gender 0.267354 −0.63727 −0.05
M-diffm for Attribute Age 0.402478 −0.16454 −0.025a
a t-Statistics = ParameterStd. Err. ≥ 2.
allows us to cluster related theories, and to explain observed results
in terms of a small number of underlying latent variables. We  found
that both our affect and esteem networks could be largely explained
by three underlying variables: balance, status, and homophily (see
Tables 13 and 14 and Fig. 2).
The three factors we were able to identify – balance, status, and
homophily – were largely orthogonal factors, although, balance,
and homophily did have some common elements.
But what do these paradigms mean in terms of sociological
mechanisms? Balance paradigm (which includes balance theory
and karma theory) can be understood as representing the general
principle of cognitive consistency. Balance theory says that indi-
viduals seek cognitive consistency in a signed network, essentially
avoiding forming negative ties with friends of friends, and vice
versa. Karma theory says that individuals seek cognitive consis-
tency by sending more negative ties if they receive more negative
ties, and similarly for positive ties. Karma theory may  also work
at the level of the tie sender, where individuals observe a person
sending many negative (or positive) ties, and thus are predisposed
to send more negative (or positive) ties to them.
The balance paradigm contributes to the existing literature by
extending traditional balance theory underlying premise of cogni-
tive consistency to generate a new theory: Karma theory. Balance
theory is traditionally used to explain the formation of positive and
negative tie formations amongst triads of friends or acquaintances.
It contains the assumption that there is some level of connection,
at most at two degrees of separation, between the actors. Karma
theory extends the principles of cognitive consistency to strangers
– to people with whom one may  have no path or chain of inter-
mediaries. Other individuals respond to your positive and negative
ties but they do so irrespective of whether you share connections
to third parties or not. In summary, karma theory contributes a
new theory of cognitive consistency by extending the mechanism
to strangers’ and their sending of signed ties.
Status paradigm (which includes status theory, visibility theory,
and popularity theory) can be understood as representing the gen-
eral principle of prominence driving tie formation. Status theory
says individuals form positive ties with those of higher status, and
negative ties with those of lower status. In status theory, positive
and negative ties can be used as proxies for status, and thus, for
example, being the sender of the positive tie automatically places
one in a lower status position. Popularity theory states that individ-
uals are more likely to receive more positive (or negative) ties when
they either (1) have more positive (or negative) in-ties, or (2) have
some particular attribute or level of an attribute. Examples of this
include (1) the ‘rich get richer’ principle, where those nodes with
existing in-ties of one type (say positive ties), attract even more
ties of the same type (more positive in-ties); as well as (2) attribute
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Table  10
ERG model of esteem network.
Parameter Std. Err. convergence statistic
ReciprocityA 1.382759 −0.33125 −0.03a
SinkA −4.16966 −0.62619 0.007a
SourceA −1.61857 −0.42554 −0.01a
IsolatesA −5.72539 −0.82106 0.039a
In-K-StarA (2.00) 1.879187 −0.19788 0.007a
Out-K-StarA (2.00) 0.945767 −0.2163 0.066a
AKT-TA (2.00) −0.55502 −0.47229 0.01
AKT-CA (2.00) −0.26441 −0.14651 −0.007
AKT-DA (2.00) 0.853616 −0.36639 0.02a
AKT-UA (2.00) 0.528076 −0.42111 0.02
A2P-TA (2.00) −0.08345 −0.02359 −0.001a
rbA for Attribute Gender 0.245798 −0.17746 −0.057
rbA  for Attribute Exec 0.998158 −0.31736 −0.006a
rsA for Attribute Gender −0.09457 −0.1265 0.046
rsA for Attribute Exec −0.05635 −0.22344 0.001
rrA  for Attribute Gender −0.24199 −0.13379 −0.092
rrA  for Attribute Exec 0.311864 −0.092 −0.021a
receiverA of Continuous Attribute Age 0.029492 −0.02577 0.081
rbDiffA of Continuous Attribute Income −0.09324 −0.0355 −0.043a
Same Category ArcA for Attribute Race −0.20879 −0.07257 0.043a
Same Category ArcA for Attribute First SOSS Major 0.203088 −0.08725 0.014a
ReciprocityB 1.376285 −0.41246 0a
SinkB −4.78545 −0.49046 −0.015a
SourceB −2.23517 −0.43231 0.002a
IsolatesB −6.96438 −0.6375 0.022a
In-K-StarB (2.00) 2.205466 −0.21474 0.016a
Out-K-StarB (2.00) 2.137748 −0.26377 0.013a
AKT-TB (2.00) −0.67179 −1.47227 0.019
AKT-CB (2.00) −0.26044 −0.34292 0.017
AKT-DB (2.00) −0.10575 −1.22178 0.024
AKT-UB (2.00) 0.895373 −1.44748 0.02
A2P-TB (2.00) −0.01142 −0.02882 0.019
rbB  for Attribute Gender 0.284191 −0.20741 0.012
rbB  for Attribute Exec 0.01126 −0.51195 −0.01
rsB  for Attribute Gender −0.19727 −0.14539 0.001
rsB  for Attribute Exec 0.127368 −0.20789 0.001
rrB  for Attribute Gender −0.30814 −0.14505 0.04a
rrB for Attribute Exec 0.28557 −0.10524 0.012a
ReciprocityAB 0.878494 −0.35716 −0.019a
In2StarAB −0.01781 −0.013 −0.013
TKT-ABA (2.00) 0.472087 −0.22086 −0.019a
CKT-ABA (2.00) −0.5331 −0.33698 0.031
DKT-ABA (2.00) 0.284673 −0.22723 0.06
UKT-ABA (2.00) 0.306376 −0.15316 0.005a
TKT-BAB (2.00) 0.222079 −0.27161 0.013
CKT-BAB (2.00) 0.103095 −0.28134 0.02
DKT-BAB (2.00) 0.49505 −0.19779 0.023a
M-rbm for Attribute Gender −1.34483 −1.05291 −0.023
a t-Statistics = ParameterStd. Err. ≥ 2.
based popularity, such a girls having more friends, or older children
having more contacts in their mobile phones. Visibility theory, as
a variant of popularity theory, says that individuals will preferen-
tially form in-ties (both positive and negative) with highly visible
(well known) individuals. An actor may  be ‘well known’ as a result
of an actor attribute, or a high indegree, either positive or negative.
The key difference between Popularity theory and Visibility theory
is that high degrees of one ‘type’, say a high positive indegree, in
Popularity theory will only lead to more positive in-ties, while if
Visibility theory is in operation, it will lead to both greater positive
AND negative in-ties.
There are several things to note about our identification of the
larger Status paradigm, as well as its three major subcomponents:
the theories of status, popularity, and visibility. First, this is prob-
ably the clearest and cleanest loading paradigm of the three in
our factor analyses. It is very distinct and separate from the other
two dimensions. This suggests it is a strong tendency within the
underlying data. Second, the loading across three theories – status,
popularity, and visibility – suggests that one theory cannot simply
account for all of the variation and theoretical explanation that this
paradigm is required to do. In short, status theory is not enough on
its own. It needs other theories to explain social networks, even just
within the space of its own  paradigm it needs popularity and visi-
bility theory. Third, we believe we  have made a unique contribution
by introducing Visibility theory. The implications of this theory are
not just technical. If Visibility theory is of significant explanatory
value, then positive ties tend to attract negative ties, and vice versa.
This suggests support for the adage “The opposite of love is not hate
but indifference.” In our dataset, the students who  were ‘disliked’
and ‘disesteemed’ also were more likely to be ‘liked’ and ‘esteemed’,
and vice versa. Possibly the most marginalised in our dataset were
not the disliked but simply the ‘sources’ (sending only ties) and
‘isolates’ (neither send or receive ties). It also suggests a need for
future studies to control for a significant proportion of negative ties
that will flow to well know individuals, simply as a result of their
prominence.
The homophily paradigm is the only one of the three which con-
tains only one main theory – homophily theory itself. Homophily
theory, and the larger homophily paradigm, can be understood as
an in-group/out-group mechanism, with individuals, in general,
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Table  11
Goodness of Fit statistics for affect network.
Parameters Observation Sample mean Std. Dev. t-Statistica
ArcA 987 987 0 NA
ReciprocityA 232 231.893 10.573 0.01
2-In-StarA 2255 2136.673 101.863 1.162
2-Out-StarA 1567 1666.013 52.885 −1.872
3-In-StarA 4309 3561.113 541.368 1.381
3-Out-StarA 1369 1872.968 216.14 −2.332
Mixed-2-StarA 3415 3423.159 129.883 −0.063
030TA  743 759.926 102.132 −0.166
030CA  173 183.087 34.515 −0.292
SinkA  1 2.68 1.631 −1.03
SourceA 21 20.83 4.048 0.042
IsolatesA 1 1.319 1.148 −0.278
K-In-StarA(2.00) 1112.375 1111.977 13.438 0.03
K-Out-StarA(2.00) 1024.5 1024.099 7.971 0.05
K-L-StarA(2.00) 722.711 723.988 13.27 −0.096
K-1-StarA(2.00) 1503.308 1500.488 21.695 0.13
1-L-StarA(2.00) 1657.438 1651.263 13.813 0.447
AKT-TA(2.00) 601.125 598.628 40.898 0.061
AKT-CA(2.00) 424.125 420.843 46.488 0.071
AKT-DA(2.00) 556.023 553.499 36.722 0.069
AKT-UA(2.00) 610 607.389 41.902 0.062
A2P-TA(2.00) 3114.25 3112.294 63.73 0.031
A2P-DA(2.00) 1389.84 1498.896 37.208 −2.931
A2P-UA(2.00) 2052 1952.966 69.116 1.433
RbA Gender 461 462.792 22.099 −0.081
RbA  Exec 29 26.959 17.728 0.115
RsA  Gender 614 615.99 17.533 −0.114
RsA  Exec 86 80.053 14.049 0.423
RrA  Gender 637 638.581 23.497 −0.067
RrA Exec 112 91.161 21.004 0.992
T2u11A Gender 117 111.274 10.266 0.558
T2u11A Exec 8 11.115 8.407 −0.371
T1u11A Gender 196 178.214 11.559 1.539
T1u11A Exec 35 38.582 8.737 −0.41
T1au14A Gender 1372 1372.464 115.509 −0.004
T1au14A Exec 402 281.904 139.601 0.86
T1au13A Gender 2100 2127.391 142.329 −0.192
T1au13A Exec 501 426.404 195.239 0.382
T1au12A Gender 940 999.057 65.896 −0.896
T1au12A Exec 165 180.289 74.69 −0.205
SenderA Age 22,439 22,448.87 41.702 −0.237
SenderA Income 2624 2622.606 41.262 0.034
ReceiverA Age 22,366 22,398 58.677 −0.545
ReceiverA Income 2595 2609.976 57.117 −0.262
Single  SumA Age 44,805 44,846.87 85.518 −0.49
Single  SumA Income 5219 5232.582 85.257 −0.159
Single  DifferenceA Age 1203 1213.982 52.419 −0.21
Single  DifferenceA Income 1311 1310.484 48.247 0.011
Single  ProductA Age 508,802 509,646.6 1949.158 −0.433
Single  ProductA Income 7093 7169.52 243.359 −0.314
Mutual SumA Age 10,524 −1,028,042 556,322.8 1.867
Mutual SumA Income 1225 1,237,132 818,216.9 −1.51
Mutual DifferenceA Age 280 5,256,833 2,993,025 −1.756
Mutual DifferenceA Income 277 6,805,048 3,877,515 −1.755
Mutual ProductA Age 119,403 −3.10E+07 16,830,749 1.845
Mutual ProductA Income 1712 −5,279,702 2,741,815 1.926
Same  Category A Arc Race 562 568.044 20.385 −0.297
Same  Category A Arc First SOSS Major 409 409.94 21.227 −0.044
Different Category A Arc Race 425 418.955 20.385 0.297
Different Category A Arc First SOSS Major 578 577.061 21.227 0.044
Same  Category A Reciprocity Race 134 133.191 10.331 0.078
Same  Category A Reciprocity First SOSS Major 94 102.311 9.75 −0.852
Different Category A Reciprocity Race 98 98.702 9.834 −0.071
Different Category A Reciprocity First SOSS Major 138 129.583 10.699 0.787
ArcB  465 465 0 NA
ReciprocityB 7 6.838 3.348 0.048
2-In-StarB 1208 1027.614 160.362 1.125
2-Out-StarB 437 488.635 50.916 −1.014
3-In-StarB 3574 2142.467 1198.934 1.194
3-Out-StarB 350 598.493 168.664 −1.473
Mixed-2-StarB 852 845.568 135.861 0.047
030TB  49 51.038 39.285 −0.052
030CB  3 2.961 4.87 0.008
SinkB  14 14.124 3.629 −0.034
SourceB 114 113.732 7.203 0.037
IsolatesB 14 14.114 4.091 −0.028
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Parameters Observation Sample mean Std. Dev. t-Statistica
K-In-StarB(2.00) 485.769 485.38 19.126 0.02
K-Out-StarB(2.00) 296.375 296.787 13.248 −0.031
K-L-StarB(2.00) 256.246 253.999 13.32 0.169
K-1-StarB(2.00) 390.194 382.418 23.319 0.333
1-L-StarB(2.00) 535.75 540.001 24.974 −0.17
AKT-TB(2.00) 47.5 46.887 27.44 0.022
AKT-CB(2.00) 8.5 8.154 10.82 0.032
AKT-DB(2.00) 42 41.625 16.166 0.023
AKT-UB(2.00) 47.5 46.782 27.189 0.026
A2P-TB(2.00) 827.875 824.12 109.452 0.034
A2P-DB(2.00) 411.75 461.347 36.957 −1.342
A2P-UB(2.00) 1181.25 997.621 125.242 1.466
RbB  Gender 187 188.735 23.144 −0.075
RbB  Exec 4 4.018 2.269 −0.008
RsB Gender 295 296.719 19.172 −0.09
RsB  Exec 34 33.884 7.376 0.016
RrB  Gender 268 270.029 25.803 −0.079
RrB  Exec 81 80.817 16.938 0.011
T2u11B Gender 6 2.365 1.647 2.207
T2u11B Exec 1 0.184 0.472 1.727
T1u11B Gender 6 4.797 2.206 0.545
T1u11B Exec 3 2.805 2.656 0.074
T1au14B Gender 694 539.188 98.374 1.574
T1au14B Exec 278 290.147 117.195 −0.104
T1au13B Gender 515 474.551 85.135 0.475
T1au13B Exec 212 169.452 80.067 0.531
T1au12B Gender 269 307.358 59.785 −0.642
T1au12B Exec 36 43.634 26.249 −0.291
SenderB Age 10,574 10,594.19 35.535 −0.568
SenderB Income 1220 1241.771 34.199 −0.637
ReceiverB Age 10,625 10,670.44 60.614 −0.75
ReceiverB Income 1219 1244.507 52.976 −0.481
Single  SumB Age 21,199 21,264.63 73.773 −0.89
Single  SumB Income 2439 2486.278 64.568 −0.732
Single  DifferenceB Age 675 672.184 51.542 0.055
Single  DifferenceB Income 673 708.389 28.584 −1.238
Single  ProductB Age 241,631 243,110.4 1680.683 −0.88
Single  ProductB Income 3198 3312.916 176.698 −0.65
Mutual SumB Age 318 −1.10E+07 5,996,732 1.833
Mutual SumB Income 35 59,857.83 158,121.8 −0.378
Mutual DifferenceB Age 6 −2,311,655 1,203,503 1.921
Mutual DifferenceB Income 5 8671.946 33,760.14 −0.257
Mutual ProductB Age 3614 −2.50E+08 1.38E+08 1.834
Mutual ProductB Income 49 440,562 482,283.3 −0.913
Same  Category B Arc Race 252 269.925 20.026 −0.895
Same  Category B Arc First SOSS Major 165 165.26 11.694 −0.022
Different Category B Arc Race 213 195.075 20.026 0.895
Different Category B Arc First SOSS Major 300 299.741 11.694 0.022
Same  Category B Reciprocity Race 6 3.851 1.992 1.079
Same  Category B Reciprocity First SOSS Major 2 2.413 1.647 −0.251
Different Category B Reciprocity Race 1 2.987 2.53 −0.785
Different Category B Reciprocity First SOSS Major 5 4.425 2.651 0.217
ArcAB  0 0 0 NA
ReciprocityAB 10 9.889 3.238 0.034
ReciprocityAAB 0 0 0 NA
ReciprocityABB 0 0 0 NA
ReciprocityAABB 0 0 0 NA
In2StarAB 1920 1911.994 205.172 0.039
Out2StarAB 1848 1647.48 61.795 3.245
Mix2StarAB 1732 1697.705 89.071 0.385
Mix2StarBA 1738 1787.674 142.6 −0.348
TABA  40 40.372 15.334 −0.024
TABB  135 58.673 27.648 2.761
TBBA  66 39.09 31.554 0.853
TBAB  39 39.218 22.142 −0.01
TAAB  47 46.301 15.419 0.045
TBAA  52 52.566 16.963 −0.033
CAAB  55 55.327 15.963 −0.02
CBBA  35 35.124 21.024 −0.006
IsolatesAB 0 0.09 0.302 −0.298
TKT-ABA(2.00) 37.25 36.425 9.928 0.083
CKT-ABA(2.00) 50.75 49.869 10.443 0.084
DKT-ABA(2.00) 42.75 42.124 10.247 0.061
UKT-ABA(2.00) 48.375 47.331 10.955 0.095
TKT-BAB(2.00) 38.5 37.444 17.744 0.059
CKT-BAB(2.00) 34.5 33.475 16.711 0.061
DKT-BAB(2.00) 59.5 34.574 19.169 1.3
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Table  11 (Continued )
Parameters Observation Sample mean Std. Dev. t-Statistica
UKT-BAB(2.00) 128.5 56.158 21.677 3.337
mrs  Gender 0 0 0 NA
mrs Exec 0 0 0 NA
mrr  Gender 0 0 0 NA
mrr  Exec 0 0 0 NA
exab  Gender 7 5.526 2.444 0.603
exab  Exec 2 1.452 1.289 0.426
exba  Gender 4 −321.935 185.338 1.759
exba  Exec 0 −281.995 192.203 1.467
mrb Gender 0 0 0 NA
mrb  Exec 0 0 0 NA
mrbm  Gender 4 3.986 2.037 0.007
mrbm  Exec 0 0.226 0.514 −0.439
msum Age 465 465 0 NA
msum Income 58 58 0 NA
mdiff  Age 23 23 0 NA
mdiff  Income 22 22 0 NA
msumm for Missing Attribute Age 0 −8.359 150.551 0.056
msumm for Missing Attribute Income 0 −5.822 18.341 0.317
mdiffm for Missing Attribute Age 0 −0.269 10.809 0.025
mdiffm for Missing Attribute Income 0 −8.582 5.601 1.532
Same  Category ArcAB Race 0 0 0 NA
Same  Category ArcAB First SOSS Major 0 0 0 NA
Different Category ArcAB Race 0 0 0 NA
Different Category ArcAB First SOSS Major 0 0 0 NA
Same  Category ReciprocityAB Race 3 5.284 2.338 −0.977
Same  Category ReciprocityAB First SOSS Major 4 3.678 1.942 0.166
Different Category ReciprocityAB Race 7 4.604 2.298 1.043
Different Category ReciprocityAB First SOSS Major 6 6.211 2.59 −0.081
#  Std. Dev. In-degree dist A 2.691 2.527 0.14 1.175
#  Skew In-degree dist A 1.243 0.869 0.226 1.659
#  Std. Dev. Out-degree dist A 1.537 1.748 0.104 −2.014
#  Skew Out-degree dist A −0.474 0.665 0.216 −5.276
#  Global Clustering Cto A 0.237 0.228 0.026 0.368
#  Global Clustering Cti A 0.165 0.178 0.019 −0.674
#  Global Clustering Ctm A 0.218 0.221 0.023 −0.171
#  Global Clustering Ccm A 0.152 0.16 0.025 −0.316
#  Std. Dev. In-degree dist B 2.738 2.485 0.202 1.25
#  Skew In-degree dist B 3.012 2.049 0.391 2.459
#  Std. Dev. Out-degree dist B 1.425 1.544 0.113 −1.055
#  Skew Out-degree dist B 1.339 2.217 0.296 −2.962
#  Global Clustering Cto B 0.056 0.051 0.029 0.192
#  Global Clustering Cti B 0.02 0.024 0.01 −0.327
#  Global Clustering Ctm B 0.058 0.057 0.025 0.01
#  Global Clustering Ccm B 0.011 0.009 0.01 0.13
a t-Statistics = observation−sample meanstandard deviation .
Table 12
Goodness of Fit statistics for esteem network.
Parameters Observation Sample mean Std. Dev. t-Statistica
ArcA 540 540 0 NA
ReciprocityA 14 14.135 4.191 −0.032
2-In-StarA 1559 1392.022 108.699 1.536
2-Out-StarA 495 530.08 50.41 −0.696
3-In-StarA 4665 3357.854 721.964 1.811
3-Out-StarA 348 530.151 288.918 −0.63
Mixed-2-StarA 989 996.798 108.332 −0.072
030TA  81 87.624 36.167 −0.183
030CA  4 4.736 7.187 −0.102
SinkA  4 4.035 1.921 −0.018
SourceA 118 118.081 6.683 −0.012
IsolatesA 3 2.945 1.687 0.033
K-In-StarA(2.00) 604.235 604.409 15.834 −0.011
K-Out-StarA(2.00) 353.875 353.993 7.834 −0.015
K-L-StarA(2.00) 306.734 301.655 11.186 0.454
K-1-StarA(2.00) 471.44 444.296 26.049 1.042
1-L-StarA(2.00) 661.313 677.355 23.259 −0.69
AKT-TA(2.00) 74.75 75.616 19.664 −0.044
AKT-CA(2.00) 11.5 12.37 14.591 −0.06
AKT-DA(2.00) 74.75 75.637 20.988 −0.042
AKT-UA(2.00) 79 80.02 21.615 −0.047
A2P-TA(2.00) 959.75 962.667 83.192 −0.035
A2P-DA(2.00) 464.125 500.634 34.586 −1.056
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Parameters Observation Sample mean Std. Dev. t-Statistica
A2P-UA(2.00) 1525.25 1361.452 99.13 1.652
RbA  Gender 194 194.492 15.645 −0.031
RbA Exec 21 21.382 8.93 −0.043
RsA  Gender 351 350.397 12.162 0.05
RsA  Exec 44 44.79 11.462 −0.069
RrA  Gender 279 280.147 20.371 −0.056
RrA  Exec 119 119.371 18.499 −0.02
T2u11A Gender 4 3.999 2.005 0
T2u11A Exec 1 3.43 2.804 −0.866
T1u11A Gender 13 9.98 3.404 0.887
T1u11A Exec 3 6.604 3.572 −1.009
T1au14A Gender 644 594.297 97.704 0.509
T1au14A Exec 549 544.893 142.296 0.029
T1au13A Gender 567 517.59 63.181 0.782
T1au13A Exec 237 274.281 117.295 −0.318
T1au12A Gender 314 348.144 41.552 −0.822
T1au12A Exec 56 70.323 58.598 −0.244
SenderA Age 12,249 12,250.11 30.417 −0.036
SenderA Income 1399 1439.44 32.026 −1.263
ReceiverA Age 12,416 12,413.17 57.102 0.05
ReceiverA Income 1448 1425.956 52.826 0.417
Single  SumA Age 24,665 24,663.28 65.332 0.026
Single  SumA Income 2847 2865.396 65.325 −0.282
Single  DifferenceA Age 751 753.499 35.257 −0.071
Single  DifferenceA Income 747 746.855 27.921 0.005
Single  ProductA Age 281,733 281,634.1 1485.599 0.067
Single  ProductA Income 3794 3882.776 181.932 −0.488
Mutual SumA Age 640 −1.20E+07 6,399,381 1.854
Mutual SumA Income 70 −5,760,140 3,579,987 1.609
Mutual DifferenceA Age 22 2,320,484 1,344,176 −1.726
Mutual DifferenceA Income 18 5,277,528 2,906,804 −1.816
Mutual ProductA Age 7316 −2.80E+08 1.49E+08 1.853
Mutual ProductA Income 90 −2.40E+07 14,412,406 1.666
Same  Category A Arc Race 273 272.547 16.093 0.028
Same  Category A Arc First SOSS Major 209 208.69 12.598 0.025
Different Category A Arc Race 267 267.453 16.093 −0.028
Different Category A Arc First SOSS Major 331 331.31 12.598 −0.025
Same  Category A Reciprocity Race 6 6.135 2.457 −0.055
Same  Category A Reciprocity First SOSS Major 6 5.757 2.436 0.1
Different Category A Reciprocity Race 8 8 3.298 0
Different Category A Reciprocity First SOSS Major 8 8.378 3.28 −0.115
ArcB  380 380 0 NA
ReciprocityB 7 6.973 2.676 0.01
2-In-StarB 776 689.256 65.992 1.314
2-Out-StarB 244 265.244 33.801 −0.628
3-In-StarB 1880 1203.171 285.382 2.372
3-Out-StarB 165 266.104 103.234 −0.979
Mixed-2-StarB 543 545.835 65.265 −0.043
030TB  17 17.587 9.424 −0.062
030CB  1 1.075 1.428 −0.053
SinkB  17 16.93 3.706 0.019
SourceB 116 116.016 7.015 −0.002
IsolatesB 17 16.893 4.082 0.026
K-In-StarB(2.00) 351.848 351.774 14.859 0.005
K-Out-StarB(2.00) 176 175.77 10.552 0.022
K-L-StarB(2.00) 209.929 213.065 9.912 −0.316
K-1-StarB(2.00) 282.075 283.586 18.589 −0.081
1-L-StarB(2.00) 399.875 400.456 17.95 −0.032
AKT-TB(2.00) 16.5 16.586 7.694 −0.011
AKT-CB(2.00) 3 3.164 4.029 −0.041
AKT-DB(2.00) 16.5 16.574 7.628 −0.01
AKT-UB(2.00) 17 17.095 8.234 −0.011
A2P-TB(2.00) 537.25 539.393 60.361 −0.036
A2P-DB(2.00) 236.375 258.224 30.002 −0.728
A2P-UB(2.00) 768 682.183 62.904 1.364
RbB  Gender 138 137.45 14.374 0.038
RbB  Exec 5 5.154 3.275 −0.047
RsB  Gender 239 238.52 11.53 0.042
RsB  Exec 30 30.14 6.909 −0.02
RrB  Gender 205 204.497 17.588 0.029
RrB  Exec 63 63.608 16.135 −0.038
T2u11B Gender 6 2.115 1.468 2.647
T2u11B Exec 0 0.261 0.608 −0.428
T1u11B Gender 7 4.995 2.206 0.909
T1u11B Exec 3 2.575 1.934 0.22
T1au14B Gender 403 312.044 62.133 1.464
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Parameters Observation Sample mean Std. Dev. t-Statistica
T1au14B Exec 191 196.548 83.307 −0.067
T1au13B Gender 320 279.322 43.694 0.931
T1au13B Exec 125 115.343 59.298 0.163
T1au12B Gender 143 155.203 32.977 −0.37
T1au12B Exec 22 33.36 24.682 −0.46
SenderB Age 8665 8644.812 26.618 0.758
SenderB Income 973 1018.954 26.429 −1.739
ReceiverB Age 8726 8704.229 44.744 0.487
ReceiverB Income 1052 1029.081 47.767 0.48
Single  SumB Age 17,391 17,349.04 55.08 0.762
Single  SumB Income 2025 2048.034 55.432 −0.416
Single  DifferenceB Age 539 514.382 27.391 0.899
Single  DifferenceB Income 601 583.125 25.718 0.695
Single  ProductB Age 198,984 198,047.1 1254.641 0.747
Single  ProductB Income 2671 2754.95 152.767 −0.55
Mutual SumB Age 318 −8.68E+06 4,900,920 1.772
Mutual SumB Income 34 −1,705,139 1,145,003 1.489
Mutual DifferenceB Age 10 1,346,352 756,037.8 −1.781
Mutual DifferenceB Income 4 −690,642 397,073.2 1.739
Mutual ProductB Age 3605 −2.00E+08 1.13E+08 1.771
Mutual ProductB Income 41 −4,368,213 3,001,036 1.456
Same  Category B Arc Race 215 218.141 14.282 −0.22
Same  Category B Arc First SOSS Major 142 133.878 10.566 0.769
Different Category B Arc Race 165 161.86 14.282 0.22
Different Category B Arc First SOSS Major 238 246.122 10.566 −0.769
Same  Category B Reciprocity Race 5 3.992 1.953 0.516
Same  Category B Reciprocity First SOSS Major 2 2.45 1.562 −0.288
Different Category B Reciprocity Race 2 2.981 1.853 −0.529
Different Category B Reciprocity First SOSS Major 5 4.523 2.189 0.218
ArcAB  0 0 0 NA
ReciprocityAB 10 10.102 3.767 −0.027
ReciprocityAAB 0 0 0 NA
ReciprocityABB 0 0 0 NA
ReciprocityAABB 0 0 0 NA
In2StarAB 944 950.345 184.526 −0.034
Out2StarAB 949 751.236 43.439 4.553
Mix2StarAB 791 783.975 86.251 0.081
Mix2StarBA 718 817.512 106.906 −0.931
TABA  24 24.544 15.276 −0.036
TABB  43 22.305 9.539 2.17
TBBA  21 22.337 19.726 −0.068
TBAB  14 14.33 10.215 −0.032
TAAB  20 22.371 18.369 −0.129
TBAA  43 45.84 18.832 −0.151
CAAB  9 10.889 13.044 −0.145
CBBA  12 12.546 11.027 −0.05
IsolatesAB 1 0.218 0.463 1.688
TKT-ABA(2.00) 22 22.868 11.818 −0.073
CKT-ABA(2.00) 9 9.453 7.621 −0.059
DKT-ABA(2.00) 19 19.644 12.081 −0.053
UKT-ABA(2.00) 42.5 43.573 14.06 −0.076
TKT-BAB(2.00) 13.5 13.889 8.876 −0.044
CKT-BAB(2.00) 11.5 12.039 9.092 −0.059
DKT-BAB(2.00) 19.5 20.573 15.322 −0.07
UKT-BAB(2.00) 42.5 21.822 8.172 2.53
mrs  Gender 0 0 0 NA
mrs  Exec 0 0 0 NA
mrr  Gender 0 0 0 NA
mrr  Exec 0 0 0 NA
exab  Gender 5 4.087 2.153 0.424
exab  Exec 2 2.386 2.36 −0.163
exba  Gender 3 −41.054 383.211 0.115
exba  Exec 2 68.763 114.434 −0.583
mrb  Gender 0 0 0 NA
mrb  Exec 0 0 0 NA
mrbm  Gender 1 1.031 1.023 −0.03
mrbm  Exec 0 1.268 1.637 −0.774
msum Age 465 465 0 NA
msum Income 62 62 0 NA
mdiff  Age 13 13 0 NA
mdiff  Income 18 18 0 NA
msumm for Missing Attribute Age 0 3.061 173.685 −0.018
msumm for Missing Attribute Income 0 −7.019 23.086 0.304
mdiffm for Missing Attribute Age 0 2.301 6.765 −0.34
mdiffm for Missing Attribute Income 0 −3.507 6.437 0.545
Same  Category ArcAB Race 0 0 0 NA
Same  Category ArcAB First SOSS Major 0 0 0 NA
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Table  12 (Continued )
Parameters Observation Sample mean Std. Dev. t-Statistica
Different Category ArcAB Race 0 0 0 NA
Different Category ArcAB First SOSS Major 0 0 0 NA
Same  Category ReciprocityAB Race 6 4.982 2.323 0.438
Same  Category ReciprocityAB First SOSS Major 8 3.773 2.045 2.067
Different Category ReciprocityAB Race 4 5.119 2.813 −0.398
Different Category ReciprocityAB First SOSS Major 2 6.329 2.869 −1.509
#  Std. Dev. In-degree dist A 3.05 2.846 0.134 1.517
#  Skew In-degree dist A 2.602 2.093 0.291 1.751
#  Std. Dev. Out-degree dist A 1.326 1.412 0.113 −0.764
#  Skew Out-degree dist A 1.169 1.924 0.51 −1.478
#  Global Clustering Cto A 0.082 0.081 0.024 0.02
#  Global Clustering Cti A 0.026 0.031 0.011 −0.48
#  Global Clustering Ctm A 0.082 0.086 0.023 −0.187
#  Global Clustering Ccm A 0.012 0.013 0.016 −0.054
#  Std. Dev. In-degree dist B 2.244 2.1 0.11 1.311
#  Skew In-degree dist B 3.103 2.253 0.257 3.31
#  Std. Dev. Out-degree dist B 1.123 1.185 0.097 −0.632
#  Skew Out-degree dist B 1.763 2.57 0.459 −1.759
#  Global Clustering Cto B 0.035 0.032 0.013 0.186
#  Global Clustering Cti B 0.011 0.013 0.006 −0.29
#  Global Clustering Ctm B 0.031 0.032 0.012 −0.017
#  Global Clustering Ccm B 0.006 0.006 0.006 −0.007
a t-Statistics = observation−sample meanstandard deviation .
Table 13
Factor analysis of affect model.
Component
1 2 3
BalanceTh 0.78 −0.041 −0.459
SolidarityTh 0.744 0.053 0.103
StatusTh −0.154 0.802 −0.004
VisibilityTh 0.307 0.715 −0.179
KarmaTh 0.65 0.151 0.135
PopularityTh 0.344 0.875 0.15
ActivityTh 0.611 0.378 0.203
HomophilyTh 0.15 −0.038 0.934
%  variance explained 28% 26% 15%
Cronbach Alpha 0.69 0.75 NA
Notes:
1. The Cronbach Alpha for Component 1 comprises Balance Theory, Solidarity The-
ory, Karma Theory, and Activity Theory.
2. The Cronbach Alpha for Component 2 comprises Status Theory, Popularity Theory,
and Visibility Theory.
3. There is no Cronbach Alpha for Component 3 as only Homophily Theory has a
coefficient above 0.6.
Table 14
Factor analysis of esteem model.
Component
1 2 3
BalanceTh 0.934 0.126 0.033
SolidarityTh 0.444 0.371 0.535
StatusTh −0.192 0.796 0.13
VisibilityTh 0.304 0.787 −0.044
KarmaTh 0.864 0.064 0.15
PopularityTh 0.332 0.787 0.31
ActivityTh 0.188 0.244 0.713
HomophilyTh −0.049 −0.053 0.849
%  variance explained 26% 26% 21%
Cronbach Alpha 0.84 0.76 0.47
Notes:
1. The Cronbach Alpha for Component 1 comprises Balance Theory, and Karma The-
ory.
2. The Cronbach Alpha for Component 2 comprises Status Theory, Popularity Theory,
and Visibility Theory.
3. The Cronbach Alpha for Component 3 comprises Activity Theory, and Homophily
Theory.
likely to form ties with people who are more similar to them-
selves, and less likely to form ties with those who are different to
themselves. Homophily can be the result of both conscious choice,
unconscious bias, and environmental and institutional constraints
of opportunity.
What is important to note about our identification of homophily
as one of the three – and relatively equal – key paradigms of signed
tie formation, is that homophily has largely been only applied in
the past to positive ties. While the previous two  paradigms we
addressed – status and balance – are closely associated with signed
ties, this is not the case with homophily. Also, it is worth noting that
it was  not the author’s intention to particularly look for homophily
Fig. 2. Venn diagram of factor analyses of the eight theories of signed tie formation.
Note:  While we have named the paradigms after the major theories they encompass
(illustrated in larger font), the ‘paradigm’ and the ‘theory’ are not synonymous i.e.
although balance paradigm is named after Balance theory it also encompasses Karma
theory.
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as a likely candidate as a third major dimension driving signed
tie formation. Nonetheless, the analysis shows that homophily is
indeed significant across our networks, and it forms an independent
paradigm.
We have identified that there are three orthogonal components
to the formation of signed ties: balance, status, and homophily. Like
the three primary colours, these three components can often be
found in the real world combined in many shades, and also it does
not make sense to talk about one or another of the primary colours
as the ‘dominant’ one.
We  think the relatively equal variance in explanatory power that
we found for each of the three paradigms of balance, status, and
homophily, probably explains the mixed evidence for balance and
status in the existing literature. We  find that balance explains about
25% of the variation in tie formation. This is something, but it is not
a huge amount. Similarly, we find about the same amount for sta-
tus. However, together with homophily, we think that the models
move into much more robust territory with much higher levels of
explanatory power – with 60–70% of explained variance. We  think
this is not a small contribution to make to the signed tie literature.
6. Conclusion
In this last section, we are going end with a more modest appli-
cation of our research to the title question of this paper: “Why does
everybody hate me?”
Our study finds there are three main sources of negative ties. The
first source of negative ties is our need for ‘cognitive consistency’,
and the balance paradigm. For example, in our study, if someone is
disesteemed (disliked for election), that person is likely to return
the negative tie (see the Reciprocity B parameter in Table 10).
The second source of negative ties is our attraction to ‘promi-
nence’, and status paradigm. For example, in our study, if someone
is esteemed (liked for election), this person’s higher status means
that they are actually more likely to reciprocate the tie with a neg-
ative tie (see the Reciprocity AB parameter in Table 10).
The third source of negative ties is our dislike for outgroups, and
the homophily paradigm. For example, in our study, we  found that
men  and women were much more likely to direct negative ties at
the opposite gender than at members of their own gender (see the
rrB for Attribute Gender parameter in Table 10).
As well as identifying these three main paradigms, this paper’s
contribution has been to develop and legitimise a range of new
theories within these paradigms, most particularly Karma the-
ory (within balance paradigm) and Visibility theory (within status
paradigm).
One of this paper’s main contribution’s has been the develop-
ment of a framework for thinking about signed tie formation that
does not rely on a single theory. We  hope that this will allow for
the complexities and contradictions of real world human networks
to be properly modelled and captured.
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